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A PREGNANT PAUSE: ARE WOMEN WHO UNDERGO
FERTILITY TREATMENT TO ACHIEVE
PREGNANCY WITHIN THE SCOPE OF TITLE VII'S
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT?
CINTRA D. BENTLEY *
INTRODUCTION
An article describing a recent survey of women's views on family,
work, and society states that women want to "do it all."' Is the issue
really that women want to "do it all," or is it simply that women want
what men have always had-the opportunity to maintain their em-
ployment status while having a family?
In 1978, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII") 2 to include the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA"),3 which protects a woman's choice to become pregnant while
maintaining her position in the workforce, thereby ensuring equal op-
portunity in employment. 4 Should Title VII's guarantee of equal op-
portunity in employment for women who choose to become pregnant
while working depend on their ability to conceive "naturally?" 5 Is
there really a difference between a woman who chooses to become
pregnant, and a woman who chooses to become pregnant but requires
* 1998 J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author wishes to thank Profes-
sor Nanette Elster for her guidance and support throughout the writing of this article and Con-
nie Tamling for her assistance in the editing process
1. Women Who "Do It All" Say They Like Things That Way, AM. MARKETPLACE, May 18,
1995, at 9. The article examines a statistical survey done by the Families and Work Institute for
the philanthropic arm of the Whirlpool corporation, revealing that many women do not adhere
to the culturally stereotypical view that women must choose between employment and having a
family. See id.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1994).
3. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k).
4. See 124 CONG. REC. 21,439 ("This bill will facilitate a woman's choice to conceive and
bear children without facing undue economic hardships."); id. at 21,442 ("[This bill will] put an
end to an unrealistic and unfair system that forces women to choose between family and ca-
reer-clearly a function of sex bias in the law which no longer reflects the conditions of women
in our society."). It is important to note that Congress used the term equal opportunity not
equality, as these two terms are not synonymous.
5. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES 12 (1994). John Robertson discusses many criticisms of using medical tech-
nology to facilitate conception. See id. For example, one such criticism is the natural versus
non-natural conception dichotomy, whereby some individuals view conception through sexual
intercourse as "natural" while the use of Assisted Reproductive Technologies ("ARTs") is
viewed as "technological power running amok and robbing us of essential human characteris-
tics." Id.
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the assistance of medical technology to achieve that goal? The almost
five million couples6 struggling to become parents who may find it
difficult to reconcile the goal of achieving pregnancy with employment
demands, especially in a workplace that is not supportive of this ef-
fort,7 would answer no. This answer seems to be "common sense."
'8
To construct a barrier to a woman's already difficult struggle to
achieve pregnancy seems illogical in light of what Congress designed
the PDA to protect. Yet, the issue of whether a woman has a claim
against her employer for workplace discrimination based on an em-
ployer's policies that deny or affect her use of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies ("ARTs") is a subject of debate in the federal courts.9
An unequivocal answer to this question is necessary because the
number of individuals using advanced ARTs to achieve pregnancy is
steadily increasing. 10
This Note will attempt to clarify the issues that courts encounter
when deciding whether women undergoing fertility treatment may
state a cause of action under Title VII for pregnancy discrimination.
Part II contains a discussion of infertility and its treatment, including
diagnosis, options for treatment, and the considerations and conse-
quences involved in the use of fertility treatments. Part III discusses
the congressional impetus for amending Title VII's definition of dis-
crimination "on the basis of sex" to include "pregnancy, childbirth and
6. See AMERICAA SOC'Y FOR REPROD. MED., INFERTILrrY: AN OVERVIEW 3 (1995) [here-
inafter INFERTILITY].
7. This lack of support may manifest itself through the failure to provide medical benefits
for fertility treatments, the disparate use of employment policies against women undergoing fer-
tility treatment, or employment policies that are insufficient to allow women to utilize fertility
treatments.
8. This phrase is taken from the House Report entitled "Civil Rights Act of 1964 Preg-
nancy Discrimination," which states that Congress adopted a common sense view of what consti-
tutes pregnancy discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. See H.R. REP. No. 95-
948, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751.
9. As of the time of this writing, the author has located four suits filed since 1994. They
are Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Or. 1995); Erickson v. Board of Gover-
nors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 320 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102
(S.D. Iowa 1995), aff'd 93 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996); and Pacourek v. Inland Steel, 858 F. Supp.
1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
10. There are currently a variety of ARTs available to couples that are having difficulty with
conception. The most common ARTs are artificial insemination, reversal of sterilization, or
other surgical procedures to correct conditions such as blocked fallopian tubes. However, when
infertility stems from non-treatable conditions, i.e., deficiencies in sperm function, ovulatory dys-
function, endometriosis, or if the cause is an unknown factor, physicians will often recommend
the use of more aggressive ARTs. See Howard W. Jones, Jr. & James P. Toner, The Infertile
Couple, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1711-12 (1993). This Note discusses those women using
these more aggressive treatments.
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other related medical conditions."" This part also examines how two
federal district courts considering this question have interpreted the
PDA's scope. Part IV considers whether women undergoing fertility
treatment belong under the umbrella of the PDA. Following a brief
discussion of the federal courts' use of statutory canons to interpret
the PDA, this part applies feminist jurisprudence principles or per-
spectives to search for an answer to this question. This Note con-
cludes that allowing a woman undergoing fertility treatment to state a
claim under Title VII for pregnancy-based discrimination is consistent
with both Congress's stated purpose of the PDA and what Congress
intended the PDA to include.
II: INFERTILITY: THE INOPPORTUNE CONDITION
Infertility is a silent condition, diagnosed only as a result of a wo-
man's failure to achieve pregnancy after engaging in unprotected sex-
ual intercourse for a period of at least one year.12 Until a woman has
repeatedly failed to conceive, a couple may be unaware that a medical
condition is frustrating their goal of parenthood. Currently, it is esti-
mated that 4.9 million couples 13 in the United States have trouble con-
ceiving naturally. Further, these statistics are increasing steadily due
to two factors: the large number of thirty-five to forty-four year old
women seeking treatment 14 and the overall growth in the number of
11. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) provides as follows: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his [sic] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, enacted in 1978, amended Title VII to provide as
follows:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title [specified authorization
employment practices] shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection shall
not require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where
the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except
where medical complications have arisen from an abortion: Provided, That nothing
herein shall preclude an employer from providing abortion benefits or otherwise affect
bargaining agreements in regard to abortion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
12. See INFERTILrrY, supra note 6, at 3. Infertility is also defined as "a disease resulting in
the abnormal function of the reproductive system." RESOLVE, INC. & AMERICAN FERTILITY
SOC'Y, INFERTILITY AND NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM: A BRIEFING PAPER 1 (1993).
13. See INFERTILITY, supra note 6, at 3.
14. See Jones & Toner, supra note 10, at 1710. Many members of the baby boom generation
are among those seeking fertility treatment due to the large number that delayed the decision to
have children. See Trip Gabriel, The Fertility Market: Conflict and Competition, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
19981
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individuals that actively consider using ARTs in the hope of having
children. 15
When a couple has been unable to conceive, generally the woman
will initiate a discussion with her physician regarding the possible
problem of infertility.16 The process of diagnosing infertility involves
a "battery" of tests. 17 A woman may undergo a laparoscopy,' 8 an en-
dometrial biopsy,19 and/or a postcoital test,20 while a man will typi-
cally have his sperm examined and counted.21 These medical
examinations generally reveal that in 40% of cases, infertility is re-
lated to a male factor, in 40% of cases it is related to a female factor,
7, 1996, at Al. This delay has resulted in a decreased ability to conceive due to the decline in the
quality of eggs as a woman ages. See id. Some argue that a woman who has postponed
childbearing to the point of infertility to advance her career and who suddenly hears her "biolog-
ical clock ticking" should simply live with the consequences of her choice. See Virginia Rutter,
Who Stole Infertility? Instead of Having a Fertility Crisis, Many People Have Just Become Impa-
tient With Nature, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar. 1996, at 48. It is interesting to note, however, that in
her article, Ms. Rutter quotes a sociologist discussing the prevalence of older women undergoing
fertility treatment as stating that, "[f]ocusing on aging as the primary source of infertility is a
distraction. Age becomes a factor when women have unknowingly always been infertile. These
women who, even if they'd tried to get pregnant at age 20 or 27, would have had difficulty
despite the best technology." Id. at 49. For additional responses to this argument, see generally
Tony Hope et. al., Should Older Women Be Offered In Vitro Fertilisation? An Ethical Debate, 310
BRIT. MED. J. 1455 (1995) (responding to the argument that "even though technology can fit
[older] women for pregnancy, it does not fit them for parenthood" by stating that women who do
not use fertility treatment to become pregnant are not screened for fitness, and also that older
women are just as deserving of these procedures as younger women); Samuel Issacharoff &
Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1994); and Anne Taylor Fleming, Babies Over 40, LEAR'S, Sept.-Oct.
1988, at 104.
15. See Jones & Toner, supra note 10, at 1713 ("[Ilnfertility, like cancer, was a taboo sub-
ject."); see also ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION & THE POLITICS OF
PARENTING 24 (1993) ("It is the treatment of infertility that has increased in recent years, not its
overall incidence."); Rhonda S. Tischler, Note, Infertility: A Forgotten Disability, 41 WAYNE L.
REV. 249, 251 (1994).
16. See AMERICAN Soc'Y FOR REPROD. MED., MALE INFERTILITY AND VASECTOMY RE-
VERSAL 9 (1995) [hereinafter MALE INFERTILITY].
17. Jerry Carroll, Tracing the Causes of Infertility, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 5, 1990, at B3 .
18. A laparoscopy involves "[a] surgical procedure that allows viewing of the internal pelvic
organs. During the procedure a long, narrow telescope-like instrument, called a laparoscope, is
inserted through an incision in or below the woman's navel. One or two other incisions may be
made for inserting additional instruments." AMERICAN Soc'Y FOR REPROD. MED., IVF AND
GIFT: A GUIDE To ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 18 (1995) [hereinafter GUIDE TO
ARTs].
19. An endometrial biopsy involves "[t]he extraction of a small piece of tissue from the
endometrium (lining of the uterus) for microscopic examination. The results indicate whether or
not the endometrium is at the appropriate stage for successful implantation of a fertilized egg."
INFERTILITY, supra note 6, at 13.
20. A postcoital test involves "[t]he microscopic analysis of a sample of cervical mucus,
usually collected within 18 hours after intercourse. This test determines the quality of cervical
mucus and the ability of sperm to enter and penetrate the mucus." Id. at 14.
21. See Carroll, supra note 17, at B3; see also Felicia R. Lee, Infertile Couples Forge Ties
Within Society of Their Own, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1996, at Al. These articles also indicate that
the majority of testing is done on the females' reproductive system.
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and the remaining 20% is a combination of both a male and female
factor.
22
After infertility is diagnosed, the infertile couple's response may
range from shock and anger to hopelessness and despair.23 The wish
to have a child, an event considered a part of "normal life," is unful-
filled.24 For infertile couples, the chance to have a child has suddenly
become no longer a right, but a privilege. 25 While sometimes equally
responsible for the failure to conceive, women and men often deal
with this diagnosis differently.
26
As recently as forty years ago, the medical community considered
the types of infertility discussed in this Note to be untreatable, leaving
infertile couples with the option either to adopt or remain childless.2 7
However, times have changed.28 With the advent of ARTs, medicine
now provides a third option-continuing the pursuit of pregnancy.
2 9
The first successful birth using In Vitro Fertilization ("IVF") 30 oc-
curred in London, England in 1978. 31 It was an additional four years
before the first IVF baby was born in the United States.32 Therefore,
the current choices facing infertile couples now include remaining
childless, adopting, or utilizing ARTs to conceive.33
For some, remaining childless is simply not an option.34 Adop-
tion can provide infertile couples with the experience and joys of child
22. See MALE INFERTILrrY, supra note 16, at 3.
23. See AMERICAN Soc'Y FOR REPROD. MED., INFERTILITY: COPING AND DECISION MAK-
ING 4-5 (1995) [hereinafter COPING].
24. See Elizabeth Liddle, A Right, Not A Luxury, To Have Children, GUARDIAN (London),
May 27, 1993, at 23.
25. See Anne Lecuyer-Koich, Infertility Isn't Funny, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), Oct. 1, 1995, at
20A.
26. See Lee, supra note 21, at Al; COPING, supra note 23, at 5. For a more extensive discus-
sion of infertility's emotional and psychological effects see generally Cintra D. Bentley, Infertil-
ity: All Business, No Pleasure: The Need for Regulation of the Fertility Industry Due to Infertile
Couples' Unique Emotional and Psychological Condition (Dec. 11, 1997) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with CHI.-KENT L.Rev.).
27. See Jones & Toner, supra note 10, at 1713-14.
28. See id. at 1714.
29. See Gabriel, supra note 14, at Al ("Fewer than half the couples are successfully treated
by conventional methods .... The millions of others ... are candidates for high-tech remedies.").
30. See infra pp. 396-98 (describing IVF procedure).
31. See GUIDE TO ARTs, supra note 18, at 3.
32. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, From Lives Begun in a Lab, Brave New Joy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
10, 1996, at Al.
33. See COPING, supra note 23, at 9.
34. This Note does not advocate the position that child-free living is neither desirable, nor a
viable option for some infertile couples. Many resources are available that provide valuable
information and support for those couples that do decide to remain childless. See generally, e.g.,




rearing. Those couples who choose to adopt, however, must relin-
quish the experience of child bearing. As a result, some infertile
couples consider adoption to be a last resort because of the couples'
strong desire to have a genetically- or biologically-related child.35 The
increased success rates of ARTs and the infertile couples' desire to
"go to almost any lengths ... to have a biological child," 36 lead many
to choose what is ultimately a rigorous, challenging, and at times, dan-
gerous course of treatment to achieve pregnancy. The strength of the
couples' desire, in conjunction with the treatment's element of danger,
has fueled further criticism of ARTs as not only unnatural,37 but also
classist, 38 sexist,39 and noncommunitarian. 40 However, those couples
choosing treatment view ARTs as the path toward "the forgotten af-
terward to the saga of infertility: the world of children and families,
holidays and birthday celebrations that without new technologies
would never have been."'41
There are currently a variety of ARTs from which couples can
select. The three most commonly known procedures-that when used
may result in a pregnancy where both the husband and wife are genet-
ically-related to the child-are IVF, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer
("GIFT") and Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer ("ZIFT"). These proce-
dures are comprised of the same four steps: ovulation induction, egg
retrieval, insemination, and transfer.42 The procedures differ with re-
spect to the location where fertilization of the egg occurs. These steps
belong to a woman's actual life experience of infertility and fertility
treatment because even when male infertility is the cause of failed
conception, it is the woman who must undergo the treatment. 43
35. See Bob Shacochis, Missing Children: One Couple's Anguished Attempt to Conceive,
HARPER'S, Oct. 1996, at 57-59; see also Carroll, supra note 17, at B3 ("For most men and women,
having children is seen as another of life's rites of passage, a connection with the deep river of
biological continuity that flows from past to future."). But see BARTHOLET, supra note 15, at 30-
35 (advocating strenuously in favor of adoption as a primary option, not as a last resort).
36. Dolores Kong, The Painful Quest for Fertility; Costs, Effects of Treatments Questioned;
What Price Pregnancy?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1996, at Al.
37. See ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 12.
38. See id. at 225-27.
39. See id. at 228-31.
40. See id. at 231-34.
41. Rosenthal, supra note 32, at Al.
42. See generally GUIDE TO ARTs, supra note 18, at 4-12.
43. See Kong, supra note 36, at Al. The District Court in Krauel did not find this fact
persuasive when dismissing the plaintiffs Title VII disparate impact claim, which examines em-
ployment practices that are "fair in form or facially neutral [but] are discriminatory in opera-
tion." Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 113 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd, 95 F.3d
674 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982)). The Krauel court held
that the fact that women undergo the majority of infertility treatment was "a consequence of
medical techniques and practices," not a result of the Iowa Methodist Medical Center's decision
[Vol. 73:391
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Step one: During ovulation induction, a woman is placed on one
of several possible fertility drugs to allow for the production of multi-
ple mature eggs instead of a single egg, which normally results from
natural ovulation.44 Fertility drugs have several potentially danger-
ous, even fatal side effects.45 Studies have traced some 60 deaths, 370
hospitalizations, and 50 disabilities to the high-dose hormones used to
stimulate a woman's ovaries to produce the multiple eggs required for
these procedures. 46 Included in these statistics are the increasing
number of women experiencing ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome. 47
Also included are other less severe reactions that range from neuro-
logical symptoms to skin problems. 48 Despite these risks, many wo-
men are willing "to pay the price" for the opportunity to become
pregnant.49 Step two: Egg retrieval is accomplished through either
transvaginal ultrasound aspiration5° or laparoscopy. 51 Both proce-
dures are invasive, requiring the use of a needle to aspirate ripened
not to provide insurance coverage for fertility treatments. Id. at 1140. This rationale is consis-
tent with the Krauel court's bifurcation of infertility from its treatment, see infra Part III.C.2.,
which does not realistically represent a woman's experience of infertility, see infra Part IV.B.
44. See GUIDE TO ARTs, supra note 18, at 4.
45. The potential dangers of these side effects are explicitly recognized in the realm of egg
donation. Most programs using egg donors require donors to provide their own health insurance
due to the potential for medical complications. See SUSAN L. CROCKIN, FAMILY BUILDING
THROUGH EGG AND SPERM DONATION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES 137 (Machelle
M. Seibel ed., 1996). There has also been some movement by programs toward either the
purchase of group insurance for donors, or the temporary addition of the donor to the program's
coverage. See id.
46. See Kong, supra note 36, at Al. Kong reports that neither the Food & Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA"), nor drug manufacturers record the number of women currently taking these
drugs, therefore reaction rates cannot accurately be calculated. See id. Statistics are therefore
dependant on the clinics' voluntary reporting. See id. Voluntary reporting, however, may not be
reliable enough as indicated by the incidents of informed consent violations that have increased
in number. See id. Critics of ARTs have also asserted that the women taking these drugs are
being used as test sites for drugs that have FDA approval for certain listed conditions, but are
being used "off-label" for fertility treatments. See id. Perhaps evidence of such abuses is further
suggestive of the need for regulation in this area. For a detailed analysis of abuses occurring in
the infertility industry and the need for regulation, see generally Bentley, supra note 26.
47. See Kong, supra note 36, at Al. Traditionally, a woman placed on fertility drugs is ex-
pected to produce about six ripened eggs. See id. Ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome occurs
when a woman produces two or three times that amount. See id. At best, a woman will only
experience severe pain, but at worst this condition can require hospitalization and is potentially
life threatening. See id. The percentages of women reported to suffer from this syndrome have
varied. See id. Again, due to the lack of knowledge regarding reaction rates, the number of
women experiencing this syndrome is dependant upon clinics that voluntarily report such inci-
dents. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. Some criticize this aspect of ARTs as representative of male control over female
reproductive rights. See BARTHOLET, supra note 15, at 29-30; ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 228-
31.
50. Transvaginal ultrasound aspiration is "[a]n ultrasound guided technique for egg retrieval
whereby a long, thin needle is passed through the vagina into the ovarian follicle and suction is
applied to retrieve the egg." GUIDE TO ARTs, supra note 18, at 19.
1998]
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eggs directly from the ovarian follicles. 52 Step three: For insemina-
tion to occur, a sperm sample is obtained on the day of egg retrieval
and, after preparation, 53 the sperm is injected into the eggs (with
IVF), combined in a petri dish with the eggs (with IVF or ZIF), 54 or
simply mixed with the eggs (with GIFT) to allow for adhesion or ac-
tual fertilization.55 Step four: During transfer, another invasive pro-
cedure, the embryo, gamete, or zygote resulting from step three is
transferred either to the uterine cavity (as with IVF), or into the fallo-
pian tubes (as with GIFT or ZIFT).56
These procedures are both physically and emotionally taxing on
the women who undergo them.57 While the husband may participate
in this process, helping his wife with the various regimens she must
follow or providing emotional support, he can never fully understand
his wife's experience because it will never be his own.58 One husband
described this experience in the following manner:
There were cognitive and psychological issues [that] I came to
realize were not mine and never would be, given my gender and its
biological limitations. In the ongoing rehearsals for parenthood I
was conception's silent partner, a passive investor, spermatologi-
cally speaking, whereas my wife was the line producer, subject to
the paralyzing responsibilities of opening night.59
Often one attempt may not achieve pregnancy; therefore some
women will voluntarily undergo several attempts, 60 enduring the emo-
51. See supra note 18 (describing procedure). It should be noted that the use of laparos-
copy for egg retrieval is not as common as is the use of transvaginal ultrasound aspiration.
52. Transvaginal ultrasound aspiration is more commonly used for IVF procedures while
laparoscopy is generally used for GIFT and ZIFT procedures. See GUIDE TO ARTs, supra note
18, at 5, 9.
53. This procedure segregates the most motile or rapidly moving sperm to be used in the
ART procedure. See id. at 6.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 8-11.
56. See id. at 8, 10-11.
57. See Tischler, supra note 15, at 251.
58. See LUCE IRIGARAY, AN ETHics OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 13 (Carolyn Burke and Gil-
lian C. Gill trans., 1984) ("I will never be in a man's place, never will a man be in mine.
Whatever identifications are possible, one will never exactly occupy the place of the other-they
are irreducible one to the other.").
59. Shacochis, supra note 35, at 59.
60. Theoretically, a woman may undergo as many procedures as she chooses and can afford
to pay for. This fact has generated much criticism of ARTs as being reserved for only those who
can actually afford the procedures. See Gabriel, supra note 14, at Al; see also supra note 38 and
accompanying text; Bentley, supra note 26, at 7 n.68. Also, some have raised ethical considera-
tions regarding fertility experts who recommend unnecessary aggressive treatment in response to
an infertile couple's desperation, which may allow treatment to continue even when further at-
tempts have little chance for success. See Gabriel, supra note 14, at Al. See generally Bentley,
supra note 26. Ten states have addressed these concerns by mandating insurance coverage for
fertility treatments that generally limits the number of attempts to five, having the effect of
[Vol. 73:391
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tional pain and physical discomfort involved, simply for the joy of po-
tential parenthood. In other words, the only reason that a woman
undergoes fertility treatment is to become pregnant.
61
The process can become all encompassing, compelling some wo-
men to leave their employment temporarily because undergoing fertil-
ity treatment can be a full-time job.62 But what about those women
who do not, or cannot leave or limit their employment? Recent statis-
tics indicate that most women "have no plans to stop" or "cut back on
work" until retirement.63 Therefore, some women will instead choose
to remain in the workplace and attempt to reconcile their efforts to
become pregnant with their ongoing employment status. As a result,
some of these women may experience an additional unexpected side-
effect of their decision: either their employer's insurance plans deny
reimbursement for the cost of ART procedures, or their employer ter-
minates them upon learning that they are beginning to undergo fertil-
ity treatment. Is this result right, or ethical, or more important, legal?
III. DEFINING PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION: PREGNANCY OR
POTENTIAL FOR PREGNANCY?
A. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act. It Is All a Matter of
Common Sense.
With the advent of the PDA, common sense returned to the law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in the employment con-
text. The PDA defines employment policies that discriminate against
a woman based on her potential for pregnancy, which prevented her
full participation in the workplace, as violative of Title VII.64 How-
regulating costs, thereby making fertility treatments more accessible. See id. It is significant that
statutes mandating coverage of fertility treatments refer to infertility benefits as "pregnancy-
related benefits." See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 175 § 47H (West 1987 & Supp. 1997);
Hugh Dellios & Harlene Ellin, Infertility Bill Wins Surprise Edgar OK, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24,
1991, at 1 ("[Governor] Edgar [of Illinois] said the bill would not constitute just another costly
mandate on business, but would be merely an extension of pregnancy coverage.").
61. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in holding that women undergo-
ing fertility treatment are within the scope of the PDA, noted "[a]s Plaintiff aptly responds,
Imedical efforts to deal with infertility have no other goal than to achieve pregnancy."' Erickson
v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 320 (N.D. Ill. 1995); see also Jones & Toner, supra note
10, at 1711 ("Whether treatment enhances subsequent fertility has not been settled, but several
studies report significantly more pregnancies in treated than in untreated couples.").
62. See Carroll, supra note 17, at B3.
63. ROPER ORG., 1995 VIRGINIA SLIMS AMERICAN WOMEN'S POLL 21 (1996).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, supra note 8, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4751.
The Supreme Court has also interpreted the PDA in this manner. See UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) ("Respondent has chosen to treat all its female employees as
potentially pregnant; that choice evinces discrimination on the basis of sex.").
1998]
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ever, it appears that some confusion remains regarding what Congress
considers to be the ultimate goal of the PDA. Some scholars interpret
the PDA as an independent cause of action, distinct from that under
Title VII, which directs employers to treat men and women equally
and to ignore any differences between them, biological or otherwise,
with regards to matters of employment.65 In an attempt to support
this perception of the PDA, "equal treatment" advocates place an em-
phasis on the PDA's second clause, which reads, "and women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes. '66 However,
the equal treatment view of the PDA is inaccurate for two reasons:
First, the "equal treatment" rationale does not correctly represent the
congressional purpose of the PDA,67 and second, this reading would
eliminate a disparate impact analysis for pregnancy-based claims be-
cause by definition, facially neutral employment policies treat employ-
ees equally. 68 Congress clearly did not intend the PDA to dictate such
a result. 6
9
Congress amended § 2000e, the definitions section of Title VII, in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert.70 The Gilbert Court applied the same analysis previously used
in Geduldig v. Aiello,7' a pregnancy discrimination case decided under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, to interpret
whether Title VII protected women from pregnancy-based discrimina-
tion.72 In Geduldig, the Court upheld an employer's disability plan,
which excluded coverage for disabilities resulting from normal
pregnancies, against a constitutional gender discrimination chal-
65. See generally Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treat-
ment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985); Brief of the
ACLU as Amici Curiae, California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No.
85-494).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
67. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
68. See Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 934-35 (1985).
69. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, supra note 8, at 3-4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4751-
52; 124 CONG. REC. 21435 (,[T]he narrow approach of the bill is simply to eliminate confusion
by expressly clarifying that the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII includes pregnancy-
based discrimination."). The Supreme Court agrees. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 n.14 (1983) ("The meaning of the [PDA's] first clause
is not limited by the specific language in the second clause .... ); California Fed. Sav. and Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-85 (1987) ("Rather than imposing a limitation on the reme-
dial purpose of the PDA, we believe that the second clause was intended to overrule the holding
in Gilbert and to illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied.").
70. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
71. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
72. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 407-10.
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lenge.73 The Geduldig Court reasoned that while the employer's plan
did result in the disparate treatment of two classes, those classes were
pregnant and nonpregnant employees not female and male employ-
ees.74 While the employer's plan was underinclusive-the plan did
not cover all disabilities suffered by employees-because the non-
pregnant class could consist of both men and women, the employer's
plan did not discriminate on the basis of gender.75 Therefore, after
Geduldig, employers could continue to include or exclude pregnancy
or pregnancy-related conditions from their benefit plans' coverage as
"with respect to any other physical condition. '' 76
The Gilbert Court applied the above analysis, despite the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") regulations inter-
preting Title VII to the contrary, 77 to hold that an employer's failure
to provide insurance coverage for disabilities arising from pregnancy
did not discriminate on the basis of sex under Title V11. 78 The Gilbert
Court also did not find dispositive the fact that General Electric
("GE") failed to cover disabilities that are unique to women because
with respect to those covered disabilities,79 men and women received
equal coverage. 80 The Gilbert Court considered pregnancy merely an
73. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 495-96.
74. See id. at 496-97, 497 n.20.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 497 n.20; see also Andrew Weissmann Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 690, 692 (1983). Interestingly, Weissmann notes that the
reasoning used by the Geduldig Court to hold that the exclusion of pregnancy benefits is not
gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause also allows courts to hold that
singling out pregnancy as the only disability to receive benefits under an employer's disability
plan is not discriminatory to men. See id. at 692 n.10. This is exactly what at least one court has
held. See Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264, 1266 (D.
Mont. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982). Importantly, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the PDA in the same manner. See California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 287 (1987) ("[I]f Congress had intended to prohibit preferential treatment,
it would have been the height of understatement to say only that the legislation would not re-
quire such conduct.").
77. The Court considered EEOC guidelines for interpreting the PDA written in 1972 that
stated, "[benefits] shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms
and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities" inconsistent with earlier
EEOC interpretations written in 1966 that stated, "a company's group insurance program
which... excludes from its long-term salary continuation program those disabilities which result
from pregnancy and childbirth would not be in violation of Title VII." Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 140-
43.
78. See id at 145-46.
79. The dissent pointed out that under GE's plan, "[w]omen like men, would be entitled to
draw disability payments for their circumcisions and prostatectomies, and neither sex could
claim payment f6i" pregnancies, breast cancer, and other excluded female dominated disabili-
ties," to demonstrate that GE's plan actually discriminated against women even though GE ar-
gued the plan was gender-neutral. Id. at 153 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 138.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
extra disability that the employer chose not to cover.81 The Gilbert
Court, echoing the Geduldig Court, stated that GE's failure to cover
pregnancy and pregnancy-related conditions created two classes, preg-
nant and nonpregnant employees, and therefore, was not discrimina-
tory to women because the nonpregnant classification included both
men and women.
82
The Gilbert dissenters, Justices Brennan and Stevens, each illus-
trated the lack of common sense in the majority's holding. First, Jus-
tice Brennan stated that the question of whether GE's plan treated
men and women equally depended on whether one viewed the plan to
cover men and women equally with regard to those conditions that the
plan covered, or whether one viewed the plan as covering all male-
specific conditions and not all female-specific conditions.8 3 To deter-
mine which perspective of GE's plan the Court should use to reach its
decision, Brennan would have required the Court to examine addi-
tional relevant evidence, including a "realistic" understanding of wo-
men's personal experiences regarding pregnancy and employment, in
conjunction with Congress's purpose for enacting Title VII: equal em-
ployment opportunities for protected groups.84
Justice Stevens stated more succinctly that by excluding coverage
for disabilities arising from pregnancy, GE failed to protect employees
from risks associated with pregnancy. 85 Because by definition, "it is
the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the fe-
male from the male," the plan failed to cover 100% of the risks faced
by women, while providing men 100% coverage. 86
Three months after the Gilbert decision, the first bill defining dis-
crimination based on pregnancy as discrimination based on sex in vio-
lation of Title VII was introduced in Congress.87 Congress had
determined that the Gilbert Court's decision would not only effect a
reversal in the current trend toward protecting women against dis-
criminatory employment practices, 8 but would also serve to endorse
81. See id. For a discussion on why the terms extra and disability indicate an inherent sex
bias, see Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 12-13 (1987).
82. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
83. See id. at 147 (Brennan J., dissenting).
84. In addition, Brennan also considered GE's history of discriminatory practice against
women to be relevant. See id. at 148-54, 159.
85. See id. at 161-62 (Stevens J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. See 123 CONG. REC. 7539-40 (1977).
88. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, supra note 8, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4752; see
also 123 CONG. REc. 29,385 (1977) ("By 1973, 73 percent of women workers received maternity
[Vol. 73:391
TITLE VII AND INFERTILITY
the historical discrimination practiced against women due to stere-
otypical ideas of a woman's value in the workplace. 89 Simply put, the
Gilbert Court misinterpreted the definition of sex-based discrimina-
tion that Congress intended when it enacted Title VII. 9°
By amending Title VII's definition of sex-based discrimination,
Congress intended only to define pregnancy discrimination as one
possible type of discrimination against women based on their sex,
which is to be analyzed under Title VII's existing framework. 91 The
PDA achieves this result through its first clause,92 which rejects the
reasoning of Gilbert, and the second clause, 93 which overrules the spe-
cific holding of Gilbert.94 Thus, Congress has created a sex-conscious,
not a sex-blind, method-which recognizes the biological differences
that exist between men and women-to further the goals of Title
VII.95 The stated purpose of Title VII is to provide those who may
face discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin, an equal
opportunity to participate in the workforce. 96 Therefore, when
viewed through the lens of the PDA, Congress guarantees women the
same opportunity that has always existed for men: the opportunity to
participate in the workforce while having a family without the fear of
losing job security or seniority.
97
B. The Reasoning: Legislative History
Congress recognized that times had changed. Employers' view of
women as temporary employees, working only to earn "pin" money
until deciding to begin a family, was outdated. 98 This stereotypical
leave accompanied by reemployment rights; and 26 percent were permitted to use sick leave for
pregnancy-related illness and disability. Now, however, the Gilbert decision has changed this
effect of Title VII and has left a gaping hole in the protection which Title VII affords to working
women.").
89. See 123 CONG. REc. 7539 (1977) ("I am afraid that lurking behind the lines of the Gil-
bert opinion is the outdated notion that women are only supplemental or temporary workers-
earning 'pin money' or waiting to return home to raise children full-time.").
90. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4750.
91. See id. at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4752 ("The narrow approach utilized by
the bill is to eradicate confusion by expressly broadening the definition of sex discrimination in
Title VII to include pregnancy-based discrimination."); see also 124 CONG. REC. 21,435 (1978).
92. See supra note 11.
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 679
n.14 (1983); California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-85 (1987).
95. See generally Weissmann, supra note 76.
96. See supra note 11.
97. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 29,387 (1977); Guerra 479 U.S. at 289 (citing 123 CONG. REC.
29658 (1977)); Brief of Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace as Amici Curiae,
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494).
98. See supra note 89.
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view had prompted employers to use a woman's larger role in the re-
productive process to view all female employees as potentially preg-
nant, thereby causing employers to relegate women to employment's
lower rungs. 99 Essentially, employers discriminated against all women
because they had the potential for pregnancy, not only those women
who were actually pregnant.
Congress found that this stereotypical view of female employees
did not comport with reality. The large number of women in the
workforce suggested that many women worked due to economic ne-
cessity.1°° In some cases, a woman's income was either the dominant
or sole source of a household's revenue. 101 Even if this woman be-
came pregnant, she often could not afford to leave her employment.
10 2
To permit an outdated, culturally stereotypical view that women work
only until they decide to begin a family would prevent many women-
even those who were not planning to have children-from advancing
in the workforce at the same rate as men. Further, it would penalize
women who did become pregnant (and their families) by denying wo-
men benefits while disabled10 3 due to pregnancy. 1°4 This stereotypical
view of women resulted in many cases where women had to choose
between their right to work and their right to bear children, compel-
ling some to remain childless to keep or advance their employment
opportunities. 05 Congress determined that Title VII must define em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of a woman's potential for preg-
nancy as discrimination on the basis of sex to prevent further
injustices from occurring. But, how does one demonstrate discrimina-
tion on the basis of a woman's potential for pregnancy? Can this type
of discrimination be translated into concrete terms?
99. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751 ("The
assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor force leads to the view of
women as marginal workers, and is at the root of the discriminatory practices which keep women
in low-paying dead-end jobs.").
100. See 123 CONG. REC. 21,436 (1977).
101. See, e.g., id.; 123 CONG. REc. 8,144-45 (1977).
102. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. 21,436 (1978); 123 CONG. REC. 29,386 (1977).
103. See supra note 81.
104. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 21,442 (1978).
105. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. 21,441 (1978) ("I have often wondered how many prospective
mothers we have lost because they knew they would not have any income at the time it was
needed most."); id. at 38,574; Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Work-
place: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. Rav. 2154, 2155 (1994) (dis-
cussing question of "whether the postponement of childbirth to the point of biological
uncertainty is the necessary price to be paid for a stellar career trajectory."); Weissmann, supra
note 76, at 716 (discussing that in enacting the PDA, Congress recognized a woman's "hidden
disability" of remaining childless).
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Congress believed that the most rational and perhaps easiest way
to prevent an employer from discriminating against a woman's poten-
tial for pregnancy would be to define sex discrimination to include
discrimination against the entire childbearing process.1°6 However,
the definition of the childbearing process would have to be broad
enough to ensure that any discrimination stemming from a woman's
potential for pregnancy would be considered violative of Title VII.107
Absent this broad scope, women would suffer from the "gaping hole"
in Title VII's commitment to equal opportunity that the Supreme
Court had created in Gilbert.10 8 By ensuring that a woman's potential
for pregnancy did not restrict her job opportunities-one of Title
VII's goals-Congress took another step toward one of society's ulti-
mate goals: equality between men and women.10 9
C. Notable Cases: Pacourek and Krauel-Two Sides of the
Same Coin.
The newest test of the PDA is this Note's topic: Whether women
undergoing fertility treatment to achieve pregnancy are included
within the scope of the PDA. Women terminated from their employ-
ment because they are undergoing fertility treatment and women
whose employers' insurance plans do not provide coverage for fertility
treatment are filing lawsuits against their employers under Title VII,
alleging discrimination on the basis of a medical condition related to
pregnancy. The federal courts have decided a small number of these
cases, reaching different results.110 Two such cases that represent the
courts' contrasting views about whether the scope of the PDA does, or
106. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753
("In using the broad phrase, 'women affected by pregnancy, childbirth and related medical con-
ditions,' this bill makes clear that its protection extends to the whole range of matters concerning
the childbearing process."). One supporter of the bill stated:
It is a pro-life, pro-family bill designed to take the pressure off the millions of families
in this country who want to have children, but who need two incomes to survive ... The
legal status of the past often forced women to choose between having children and
working .... This legislation gives her the right to choose both, to be financially and
legally protected before, during, and after her pregnancy.
124 CONG. REC. 38, 574 (1978) (statement of Rep. Jeffords).
107. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753.
108. See 123 CoNG. REc. 29,385 (1977); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Susan Deller Ross,
Pregnancy and Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1977, reprinted in 123 CONG. REc. 7540
(1977).
109. See, e.g., 124 CoNG. REc. 21,442, 38,574 (1978).
110. See supra note 9.
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should, include women undergoing fertility treatment are Pacourek v.
Inland Steel Co.,"' and Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center.
112
1. Pacourek: Heads, a claim is made and recognized.
In June 1993, Inland Steel fired employee Charlene Pacourek due
to her excessive absences from work, which were a result of her re-
ceiving fertility treatment. 113 Although Ms. Pacourek received preap-
proval for her absences and Inland Steel had no official sick leave
policy, 114 Ms. Pacourek's supervisor warned her that she may lose her
job due to her frequent absences. 115 Ms. Pacourek informed her em-
ployer that to stop attending her appointments would disrupt her
treatment and eliminate her chances for pregnancy. 116 So, after em-
ploying Ms. Pacourek for eightee.n years, Inland Steel fired her.117
Ms. Pacourek filed a lawsuit in January 1994 in federal court, al-
leging that Inland Steel ended her employment in violation of several
anti-discrimination statutes, including Title VII, as amended by the
PDA. 118 The suit alleged that Inland Steel attempted to implement a
sick leave policy for Ms. Pacourek that did not exist for other employ-
ees, resulting in the disparate treatment of Ms. Pacourek's treatment
of a pregnancy-related condition." 9 Inland Steel moved to dismiss
Ms. Pacourek's PDA claim alleging the claim lacked legal sufficiency
and supported its motion with two arguments: First, the PDA does
not protect Ms. Pacourek's inability to become pregnant; and second,
infertility is a gender-neutral condition and therefore cannot fall
111. 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994); accord Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp.
316 (N.D. Il. 1995); Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Or. 1995).
112. 915 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd, 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
113. See Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1396-97; see also Stanley Holmes, Pregnancy Law Covers
Infertility, Suit Claims, CHI. TRIB., March 28, 1994, at Ml.
114. Inland Steel told Ms. Pacourek that the company had no official sick leave policy, as
confirmed by Inland Steel's employee handbook. See Holmes, supra note 113, at Ml. The only





118. See Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1397. Ms. Pacourek also filed suit under the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act of 1967 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").
See id. Ms. Pacourek's ADA claim alleged that infertility is a disability that affects the "major
life activity" of reproduction. See id. Several articles have been written in support of this view.
See, e.g., Sandra M. Tomkowicz, The Disabling Effects of Infertility: Fertile Grounds for Accom-
modating Infertile Couples Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1051 (1996); Tischler, supra note 15. This view of defining infertility as a disability, however, is
considered controversial by some support groups, similar to the view that pregnancy as a disabil-
ity is prejudicial to women.
119. See Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1397.
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within the scope of the PDA. °20 Critically, by presenting the issue to
the court absent any reference to the treatment of infertility, Inland
Steel bifurcated the condition of infertility from fertility treatment.
The Pacourek court recognized how Inland Steel had chosen to
present the issue and addressed the importance of the missing refer-
ence to fertility treatment:
The parties cast the conflict here as merely over whether plain-
tiff's medical inability to become pregnant is a medical condition
related to pregnancy for the purposes of the PDA. There is a first
level of analysis, however: whether discriminating against employ-
ees based on intended or potential pregnancy is covered by the
PDA. 121
Therefore, before the court began its analysis of whether Ms.
Pacourek could state a claim under the PDA, the court reframed the
issue to make two inquiries: First, whether an employer's discrimina-
tion against an employee's efforts to become pregnant-her use of
fertility treatment-was within the scope of the PDA; and second,
whether the medical condition of infertility-which prevents women
from becoming pregnant naturally-was within the scope of the
PDA.122 In response to these inquiries, the court reached the follow-
ing conclusions: First, because Ms. Pacourek alleged that Inland Steel
discriminated against her due to her efforts to become pregnant, she
stated a claim under the PDA;123 and second, a basis existed within
the PDA to allow for the inclusion of the condition of infertility.
124
Addressing the first issue, the court recognized that the PDA cov-
ers a woman's intention to become pregnant, stating that this coverage
is, "the kind of truism the PDA wrote into law."1 25 Because Ms.
Pacourek was undergoing fertility treatment to become pregnant, her
employer might view her as having a potential for pregnancy. Ad-
dressing the second issue, the court applied a canon of statutory con-
struction, the plain or ordinary meaning rule,126 to hold that the term
"related," in the phrase "related medical conditions," was a "generous
120. See id. at 1401.
121. See id.
122. The Pacourek court's approach is consistent with Part IV.B of this Note. Part IV states
that to accurately represent the life experience of a woman undergoing fertility treatment these
two issues cannot be bifurcated. See infra Part IV.B. This Note argues that the reason the
Pacourek court found in favor of the plaintiff was because the court recognized all aspects of the
plaintiff's life experience.
123. See Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1402.
124. See id. at 1402-03.
125. Id. at 1401.
126. This canon states that courts should enforce the language of a statute according to its
plain or ordinary meaning. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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choice of wording, suggesting that interpretation should favor inclu-
sion rather than exclusion in close cases. ' 127 The court supported this
interpretation with a brief discussion of the PDA's legislative history
and by referencing language from prior Supreme Court decisions that
interpreted the PDA. 128
The court did not address Inland Steel's argument that infertility
is gender-neutral because the issue was not properly before the court
as Inland Steel did not claim that its policy applied to all infertile
workers.129 Therefore, on the theory that Inland Steel discriminated
against Ms. Pacourek's potential for pregnancy and that infertility is a
pregnancy-related medical condition, Inland Steel's alleged discrimi-
nation against Ms. Pacourek stated a claim under Title VII.13
°
2. Krauel: Tails, a claim is made and dismissed.
In 1994, Mary Jo Krauel gave birth to a baby girl conceived
through GIFT131 for which her employer's medical plan ("the plan")
did not provide coverage. 132 Ms. Krauel and her husband then at-
tempted to have another child without the use of ARTs, but after a
year of failing to conceive, Ms. Krauel filed suit against her employer,
Iowa Methodist Medical Center ("IMMC"), challenging the plan's
failure to provide coverage for fertility treatment as violative of sev-
eral anti-discrimination statutes, including Title VII, as amended by
the PDA. 13
3
IMMC moved for summary judgment, arguing that the treatment
of infertility is not the treatment of a pregnancy-related medical con-
dition. 34 The court, in accordance with IMMC's motion, analyzed
127. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1402. By analogy, the court considered pregnancy to be the
core of the PDA while infertility would lie on an outer circle. See id. at 1403. This analysis is
contradictory to the Krauel court's statutory construction analysis. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist
Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 111-12 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
128. See Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1402-03. Apparently, the Pacourek court found no reason
to create the negative inference of exclusion that the Krauel court made. See infra note 139 and
accompanying text.
129. See Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1403. The court did, however, comment on the veracity of
a gender-neutral argument. See id. at 1404. After noting that EEOC guidelines state that an
employer must provide pregnancy benefits even where the entire workforce is female, the court
concluded that "once it is determined that a classification is in contravention of the PDA, that
classification is not to be further tested for gender neutrality with an eye toward approving the
classification if it is found to be gender neutral in context." Id.
130. See id.
131. See supra pp. 396-98 for a description of this procedure.
132. See Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 105.
133. See id. Ms. Krauel also filed suit under the ADA. See id. at 102.
134. See id. at 111. IMMC also argued that Ms. Krauel failed to establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact discrimination under Title VII. See id. However, this Note will limit the
discussion of Krauel to Ms. Krauel's disparate treatment claim.
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Ms. Krauel's claim as if it presented only one issue: "whether the
treatment of infertility is the treatment of a medical condition related
to pregnancy or childbirth."'1 35 Using a canon of statutory construc-
tion, ejusdem generis, literally meaning "of the same kind,"'136 the
court held that the general term "related" should be read in context
with the specific subjects enumerated in the statute.137 Therefore, "re-
lated medical conditions" referenced the terms "pregnancy" and
"childbirth." The court then drew a bright line to distinguish infertil-
ity from pregnancy and childbirth. The court stated that pregnancy
and childbirth occur after conception, which it considered to be the
beginning of the childbearing process, while infertility occurs before
conception. 138 To support this interpretation, the court noted the ab-
sence of any reference to fertility treatment in the PDA's legislative
history.' 39 The court also gave credence to IMMC's argument that
infertility is gender neutral and granted IMMC's motion for summary
135. Id. at 111. This view of infertility is consistent with the court's decision in favor of the
defendant. See infra Part IV.B.
136. For an analysis of the Krauel court's use of this cannon, see infra Part IV.A.2. The court
also cursorily applied the plain meaning rule to hold that "[t]he plain language of the PDA does
not indicate that 'related medical conditions' should be interpreted broader [sic] than the context
of 'pregnancy' and 'childbirth."' See Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 112.
137. See Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 112.
138. See id. at 113. The court makes this assumption after citing to the PDA's legislative
history indicating Congress intended the entire childbearing process to be included under the
PDA. See id. The court's assumption, however, has two flaws: First, some women undergo
fertility treatment because of repeated miscarriages, therefore these women experience infertil-
ity after conception occurs; and second, the assumption fails to consider, as is the belief of this
author, that it is the choice to conceive, or the act of unprotected sexual intercourse that marks
the true beginning of the childbearing process.
139. See id. at 112. However, the absence of any explicit language referring to fertility treat-
ment would seem to lend force to an argument against creating a "negative inference" that
would limit the scope of the PDA only to those issues discussed in the legislative history. A
similar issue arose in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 667
(1983), where the Supreme Court decided that an employer's health insurance plan, which pro-
vided male employees with less extensive benefits for the pregnancy-related conditions of their
spouses than provided for the company's female employees, discriminated against male employ-
ees in violation of Title VII, as amended by the PDA. The Court held that although "congres-
sional discussion [of the then pregnancy discrimination bill] focused on the needs of female
members of the work force rather than spouses of male employees, [this did] not create a 'nega-
tive inference' limiting the scope of the Act to the specific problem that motivated its enact-
ment." Id. at 679. The majority's statement lends support to the argument of this Note-
favoring inclusion of women undergoing fertility treatment and against creating a negative infer-
ence of exclusion. Further, the dissenting justices' argument in Newport News, finding the ma-
jority's failure to find a negative inference in that case flawed, lends further support to the
argument of inclusion. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated that, "[t]his [negative inference]
reasoning might have some force if the legislative history was silent on an arguably related is-
sue." Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As noted previously, as a matter of common sense
Congress could not have considered the use of ARTs while either house debated passage of the
PDA as these advanced technologies were not yet available to the American population at that
time. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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judgment declaring that "infertility is not a sex-related medical
condition."140
3. The tie breaker.
The two courts appear to have used similar methods when inter-
preting whether the scope of the PDA includes women undergoing
fertility treatment, yet they reached different results. There are two
interesting points about the courts' decisions. First, although Inland
Steel attempted to frame the issue before the Pacourek court as
whether the condition of infertility, bifurcated from fertility treat-
ment, was within the PDA's scope, the court reframed the issue by
reconnecting the two components. Alternatively, the Krauel court ac-
cepted the manner in which IMMC framed the issue and considered
only whether the condition of infertility was within the PDA's scope.
Second, neither court gave the PDA's purpose and legislative history
extensive consideration when reaching its decision. The first point
suggests that the result of the case depended upon whether the court
attempted to understand the real question presented by the case
before it: whether women undergoing fertility treatment are included
in the PDA's scope. The second point shows that both courts decided
a case involving a matter that Congress itself could not have explicitly
considered, as the use of ARTs was not available in the United States
in 1978,141 without seeking any guidance from legislative history to
determine how Congress would have resolved the question had it
been so presented. Absent this guidance, perhaps the reason for the
courts' different outcomes did not stem from what the courts' inter-
pretive methods revealed about the PDA, but rather the outcomes
depended on who framed the question before the courts and who con-
ducted the analysis.
IV. THE PDA & WOMEN UNDERGOING FERTILITY TREATMENT:
Do THE Two BELONG TOGETHER?
A. Should We Read Between the Lines?
Although issues of statutory construction are beyond the scope of
this Note, to decide whether women undergoing fertility treatment are
within the PDA's scope, it is necessary to discuss the Pacourek and
Krauel courts' use of statutory construction canons. The canons are
140. Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 113.
141. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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themselves judicial creations, and as such, courts are not required to
invoke them when interpreting statutes.142 Significant amounts of dis-
cussion and criticism regarding the use of these canons exists. Some
critics have argued that the canons are result-oriented and prevent a
detailed examination of legislative purpose. 143 For example, one au-
thor stated that the canons are simply "conclusory explanations ap-
pended after the fact to justify results reached on other grounds."'
44
Karl Llewellyn authored a well-known critique in which he concluded
that the canons were nothing more than neutral principles because for
each canon there is an equal and opposite countercanon, thereby ren-
dering the canons useless as aides in decisionmaking. 145 Although the
use of canons is not mandated and their criticisms are well-docu-
mented, courts nevertheless invoke these canons. Why? One article
asserts that why a court would invoke these canons when a variety of
techniques exist to decide cases, such as public policy, legislative his-
tory, and community values, is the real question to be considered.'
46
Theoretically, courts will use canons of statutory construction
when the language of the statute is ambiguous. 147 Should a court in-
voke canons when it lacks expertise in a highly technical area to avoid
immersion in an unfamiliar field; or perhaps when the court cannot
accurately determine the policy implications of its policy-based deci-
sion; or when it wants to avoid future labeling of a substantive deci-
Sion as in error?148 Whether one believes the answer to these
questions is yes or no, a second question arises: Once a court has
decided to use the canons, which canon will it use? This question may
be the more relevant one for the purposes of this Note.
Perhaps the decision of which cannon to invoke is also result-
oriented. For example, although both the Pacourek and Krauel courts
applied canons of statutory construction, the courts invoked two dif-
ferent canons-the plain meaning rule and ejusdem generis, respec-
142. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and
Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 649 (1992).
143. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 921, 924 (1992).
144. Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REV.
1179, 1180. Miller is referring to academia's view of the canons' use after Karl Llewellyn's cri-
tique. See id. Llewellyn demonstrated that the canons' use is indeterminate, suggesting that if a
court invokes a canon at all, the court cannot rely on the canon as the sole factor on which the
decision is reached. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING Ap-
PEALS 521-35 (1960).
145. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 144, at 521.
146. See Macey & Miller, supra note 142, at 649.
147. See Miller, supra note 144, at 1223.
148. See Macey & Miller, supra note 142, at 659-63.
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tively-to reach different conclusions regarding the scope of the
PDA.149 Perhaps insight into the courts' different holdings comes
from examining the canons invoked as integral parts of each court's
decision rather then looking only to what the courts found the canons
to reveal..
1. Related medical conditions: Is it really crystal clear?
The Pacourek court invoked the plain meaning rule to hold that
women undergoing fertility treatment are within the scope of the
PDA. 150 The court's use of this canon seems axiomatic; why would a
court need to interpret a statutory provision whose meaning is
clear? 151 This question represents the most common criticism of this
canon, which is that text has no meaning apart from the reader's inter-
pretation. 152 The many forms that the plain meaning rule has taken 153
and the notion that a statute's language may be plain to one and am-
biguous to another, 54 reinforce this critique. Therefore, it seems the
identity and perspective of the interpreter may determine the out-
come of the analysis.
In Pacourek, the court set the groundwork for its analysis by in-
voking a general rule of interpretation "that remedial statutes, such as
149. On this point, perhaps William Jordan's discussion of the difference between American
courts and English courts-stating that the former use legislative history to guide statutory inter-
pretation where as the latter do not-may provide some guidance. See William S. Jordan III,
Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Relevance of English Practice, 29 U.S.F. L.
REv. 1, 39-41 (1994). Specifically, Jordan discusses the fact that the members of the English
judiciary are much more homogenous and apolitical than those of the American judiciary. See
id. at 39. As a result, Jordan argues that due to the diversity of the American bench, judges are
"less likely to share common understandings of the meanings of words, or rules, or have the
same views of formalism in statutory interpretation." Id. at 40. The necessary inference, as
elucidated by Jordan, is that decisions of American courts are more apt to be a result of political
decisions injected into decisionmaking. See id. at 40-41.
150. See Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (N.D.IIl. 1994).
151. See Joel R. Cornwell, Smoking Canons: A Guide to Some Favorite Rules of Construc-
tion, CBA REc., May 10, 1996, at 43. Geoffrey Miller, however, suggests that this understanding
of the plain meaning rule is incorrect. See Miller, supra note 144, at 1223-24. According to
Miller, one should not see the rule as being "based on a claim of certainty," but instead as a
weighing process, which considers "the clarity of statutory language, its consistency with underly-
ing legislative purposes and whether the costs of resort to extrinsic aids to interpretation (such as
legislative history) are likely to outweigh whatever benefits may be realized from such an enter-
prise." Id. at 1224. The Pacourek court appears to have used this approach.
152. See Shapiro, supra note 143, at 931-32 (citing Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in
Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histories,
38 U. KAN. L. REv. 815, 820-43 (1990)).
153. See Miller, supra note 144, at 1222-23. Geoffrey Miller indicates that several variations
of the plain meaning rule exist, ranging from "a virtually conclusive presumption that the plain
meaning governs," to "the plain meaning 'ordinarily' controls" to "the plain meaning is the
'starting place' for interpretation." Id.
154. See id. at 1223.
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civil rights laws, are to be broadly construed." 155 This foundation ena-
bled the court to hold that Congress's use of such "expansive lan-
guage," specifically its use of the term "related" within the phrase
"related medical conditions," suggests favoring inclusion over exclu-
sion.156 The traditional notion of the plain meaning rule would have
required that the court's interpretation conclude at this point.
157
However, the court continued its analysis by discussing Supreme
Court precedent interpreting the PDA and the PDA's legislative his-
tory to hold that "a woman's medical condition rendering her unable
to become pregnant naturally is a medical condition related to preg-
nancy and childbirth for the purposes of the [PDA].'
58
The Pacourek court's use of the plain meaning rule to reach this
result reveals that perhaps what was clear to the court was not the
PDA's language, but the difference between a woman's and a man~s
infertility. The court's initial reframing of the issue-to discuss a wo-
man's infertility and her subsequent use of fertility treatment-before
beginning its analysis, reinforces this conclusion. 159 This initial action
belies the conclusion that the court included these women solely be-
cause the plain meaning rule dictated that result. A court that does
not see the importance of how a party presents the issue will not reach
the Pacourek court's result by using the plain meaning rule.
2. Related medical conditions: Or is it not a similar class member?
Ejusdem generis160-the canon that the Krauel court relied on to
hold that women undergoing fertility treatment are not within the
PDA's scope-dictates, "when a general term follows a specific one,
the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin
to the one with specific enumeration.' 161 The Krauel court's use of
ejusdem generis seems logical because the PDA reads, "pregnancy,
childbirth and related medical conditions." However, two important
aspects of the court's analysis must be considered: First, what or who
determined what conditions are "akin" to those specifically enumer-
ated in the PDA;1 62 and second, the failure of the court to decide
155. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1402 (citing Stoner v. Department of Agriculture, 846 F.
Supp. 738, 742 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (citation omitted)).
156. See Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1402.
157. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
158. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1403.
159. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
161. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers' Ass'n., 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991).
162. M.B.W. Sinclair notes that this canon simply begs this question. See M.B.W. Sinclair,
Law & Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 373,
19981 413
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
whether including Ms. Krauel's claim would similarly further the
PDA's legislative purpose as to the terms "pregnancy" and
"childbirth.' 63
Because the Krauel court evaluated Ms. Krauel's claim as IMMC
had defined it-infertility bifurcated from its reference to fertility
treatment and potential pregnancy-the court precluded a finding
that Ms. Krauel's fertility treatment was akin to pregnancy and child-
birth under the PDA before any analysis could even begin.164 Within
this analytical framework, the court's creation of a rigid and narrowly
calibrated genus-pregnancy and childbirth occur after conception
while infertility occurs before conception165-reinforces the conclu-
sion that the court invoked ejusdem generis to bolster a decision that
the court had reached on other grounds. 166 The Krauel court at-
tempted to create a bright line rule to substitute for the congressio-
nally created list of examples in the PDA, a rule Congress could just
as easily have used if it intended this narrow delineation. 167 However,
as a detailed examination of the PDA's legislative history reveals-an
examination noticeably absent from the Krauel court's decision 168-
Congress intended to include discrimination based on a woman's po-
tential for pregnancy, however manifested. 69
The Krauel court's failure to consider seriously the PDA's legisla-
tive history raises the second problem with the court's analysis. The
Supreme Court has said that courts should use ejusdem generis "for
ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is uncer-
tainty . . . but it may not be used to defeat the obvious purpose of
legislation."' 70 Indeed, the Krauel court chided the Pacourek court
for unnecessarily considering the PDA's legislative history and pur-
pose due to their lack of any explicit reference to fertility treatment.
17'
410-11 (1985). Because items listed together may be similar or dissimilar in several ways, Sin-
clair argues that the challenge in a case where ejusdem generis is invoked is only to "the imagina-
tions of opposing counsel. It thus appears, prima facie, that the rule is useful only to bolster a
conclusion reached on other grounds." Id.
163. See supra Part III.C.3.
164. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
166. See Cornwell, supra note 151, at 45. Cornwell comments that the flaw of ejusdem
generis is its elasticity because "the advocate's challenge is to calibrate a genus that is broad
enough to include his or her desired item, or narrow enough to exclude his or her opponent's."
Id.
167. See Sinclair, supra note 162, at 411 ("Saying as much as it could as clearly and concisely
as it could, the legislature could not find a rule.") (footnotes omitted).
168. See supra Part III.C.2.
169. See supra Part III.B.
170. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936).
171. See Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 113.
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From the court's action, it seems one may infer that the Krauel court
decided that Congress had created an exhaustive list of either all con-
ditions included in the scope of the PDA, or all conditions deemed
"related medical conditions." However, to interpret the PDA in this
manner is not consistent with an analysis using ejusdem generis, but
rather an analysis using the canon expressio unis est exclusio alteris,
literally meaning, "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of an-
other." To read this precision into the PDA, the court would effec-
tively remove the benefits conferred by Congress's use of a general
termX72-such as filling the gaping hole in Title VII's commitment to
equal opportunity that the Supreme Court had created in Gilbert, or
the accessibility and ease in defining pregnancy-based discrimination
as sex discrimination.
173
The above analysis of the Pacourek and Krauel courts' use of ca-
nons suggests that the courts' decisions were, in fact, reached on
"other grounds. ' 174 Each court had a different perspective of the is-
sue before it, which in turn affected each court's use of the canons.
Therefore, canons of statutory construction do not appear to provide
a satisfactory answer to the question of whether women undergoing
fertility treatment belong under the umbrella of the PDA. Because it
was each court's perspective that led to its interpretation, perhaps an
analysis of perspective will provide a cogent explanation for the inclu-
sion or exclusion of these women under the PDA.
B. Or, Does It Just Depend on How You Look at It?
Given the above definition of infertility and subsequent fertility
treatment 175 and given that Congress intended the PDA to protect a
woman's potential for pregnancy, a woman undergoing fertility treat-
ment to become pregnant should have a cause of action under Title
VII, as amended by the PDA.176 This issue is not controversial when
172. See Miller, supra note 144, at 1200-02. Miller argues that the costs of requiring greater
specificity from legislatures would outweigh the benefits of using a more general term, i.e., the
possibility that specificity would create loopholes in the application of the statute, or adding
length and complexity to statutes that need to be readily understood by ordinary citizens. See id.
173. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Part II.
176. Ten states have enacted statutes that require employers to provide insurance coverage
for fertility treatment when an employer's health plan covers other pregnancy-related services,
thereby acknowledging the common sense view that fertility treatment is pregnancy related. See
Gabriel, supra note 14, at Al. For example, Massachusetts statutorily mandates coverage for the
"medically necessary expenses of diagnosis and treatment of infertility" under a provision enti-
tled, "Infertility, pregnancy-related benefits." MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 175 § 47H (West 1987
& Supp. 1997).
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one accepts that it is the inability to conceive a child that generates the
inquiry into whether a medical diagnosis of infertility exists. Accord-
ingly, it makes no sense to talk about fertility treatment without in-
cluding the potential for pregnancy.
How does one find otherwise? The problem stems from how this
issue is approached and subsequently framed. 177 Proponents of in-
cluding women undergoing fertility treatment within the PDA aver
that the diagnosis of infertility cannot be bifurcated from its treat-
ment. This belief allows proponents to frame the issue as: whether
women undergoing fertility treatment are included in the scope of the
PDA. Conversely, because opponents do not, or cannot, acknowledge
that the two aspects of infertility cannot be bifurcated, opponents
frame the issue as: whether women who are infertile are included in
the scope of the PDA. This explains why a court may conclude that
the phrase "treatment for a medical condition related to pregnancy"
does not include women undergoing fertility treatment: the condition
of infertility is being considered outside the context of diagnosis and
treatment.178 The consideration of infertility in this vacuum is the
root of the most common objection to finding that women undergoing
fertility treatment are within the scope of the PDA: that infertility is a
gender-neutral condition.
The structure of the argument is as follows: because both men
and women can experience infertility, it cannot follow that a woman
who alleges discrimination based on her usage of fertility treatment is
discriminated against on the basis of her sex.179 From a woman's per-
spective, however, the treatment of infertility cannot exist without ref-
erence to pregnancy. 180 A diagnosis of infertility occurs when a
woman is unable to conceive; 181 therefore, when a woman undergoes
177. Many feminist legal theorists advance the view that many areas of the law do not repre-
sent or consider a woman's perspective, but rather are based on male norms and reflect male
perspectives. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829,
842-43 (1990); Sally J. Kenney, Pregnancy Discrimination: Toward Substantive Equality, 10 Wis.
WOMEN's L.J. 351, 356 (1995); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 1279, 1279-81 (1987); Minow, supra note 81, at 32.
178. This is exactly how the Krauel court arrived at the conclusion that women undergoing
fertility treatment are not within the PDA's scope. See supra Part III.C.2.
179. Congress amended Title VII with the PDA to make clear that because only women have
the capacity to conceive a child, pregnancy-based discrimination is, by definition, discrimination
on the basis of sex. The reason the issue of whether infertility is within the scope of PDA does
not seem clear is because both men and women can be infertile.
180. See supra Part II.
181. This is explicit in the definition of infertility. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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fertility treatment she is seeking assistance with conception. 182 When
we refer to a woman's infertility as a gender-neutral condition, we
have stripped her condition of any reference to its implications for
potential pregnancy. A woman's perspective thus has been lost or ig-
nored. Therefore, the labeling of infertility as gender-neutral should
act as an alarm indicating that the law has omitted the perspective of
such a woman, leaving what is a gender-specific perspective of infertil-
ity. 183 Further analysis explains that due to certain societal patterns,
discrimination against these women can exist although both men and
women can be infertile.184 Closely examining the root of infertility's
gender-neutral label will reveal that what some may consider neutral
may not be neutral at all.
185
The definition of infertility used to reach the conclusion that in-
fertility is a gender-neutral condition appears to represent a male per-
ception of infertility, i.e., a condition unrelated to pregnancy.
86
Defining infertility in this manner eliminates a woman's personal ex-
perience of infertility and replaces it with a male perspective. 87 What
is highlighted is a condition that may exist for both men and wo-
men. 88 The law should not be satisfied with this definition of infertil-
ity because this definition, at best, inherently presumes that a
woman's experience of infertility is no different from a man's; 89 while
182. It is interesting to note that many insurance companies actually use this premise as a
defense against legal challenges to denials of coverage for ARTs. These companies claim that
because fertility treatment does not treat the illness or underlying disease, e.g., the reversal of
infertility, but are designed to achieve pregnancy they are not necessary procedures and there-
fore not covered. See, e.g., Egert v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 900 F.2d 1032, 1034, 1037 (7th
Cit. 1990); Witcraft v. Sundstrand Health & Disability Group Benefit Plan, 420 N.W.2d 785, 788-
89 (Iowa 1988).
183. See Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquires of Feminist Jurispru-
dence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 68 (1985). Wishik states that the moment when the omis-
sion of a woman's perspective is realized is the first indication that what results from this
omission is necessarily gender-specific. See id.
184. See Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response
to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REv. 265, 304 (1984).
185. See Littleton, supra note 177, at 1319.
186. Male infertility affects the ability to "deposit adequate numbers of healthy, mature,
functioning sperm into the female reproductive tract near the time of ovulation." MALE INFER-
TILrrY, supra note 16, at 8. While the discussion in this section uses a male/female dichotomy,
one must remember that some women who themselves have never experienced infertility also
cannot understand the nature of the infertile's experience. See Shacochis, supra note 35, at 62.
187. See Minow, supra note 81, at 32. Minow states that any discussion of equal treatment
attempts to "assimilate" women to an "unstated norm," which ignores the very features that
distinguish women from men. See id.
188. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 112 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affid,
95 F.3d 674 (8th Cit. 1996).
189. See Minow, supra note 81, at 39. '
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at worst, it suggests that a woman's experience of infertility is simply
irrelevant. 190
Interestingly, without the knowledge that this woman's perspec-
tive is missing, leaving infertility out of the scope of the PDA might
appear to be a logical and fair outcome. The rationale is if men and
women are being treated equally by infertility, highlighting a differ-
ence would imply that a woman's infertility deserves special treat-
ment.191 This may in fact be an attractive proposition for a legal
system that is currently attempting to resolve so many issties regarding
the treatment of biological sex differences and gender roles.192 Ac-
cepting this argument, however, ignores that equality is itself a
gendered concept. 93 To be deemed equal or the same can only occur
when two entities are compared with each other.194 The critical ques-
tion during this comparison then becomes, which entity is the norm
against which the other is compared? This question is rarely ad-
dressed in the legal context, thereby leaving unquestioned the identity
of the norm. 95 In the realm of gender differences, the identity of this
unstated point of comparison is male.196 That it is the female's capac-
ity to conceive is what is considered different, rather than the male's
incapacity illustrates this fact. Therefore, to define infertility as gen-
der-neutral will only serve to perpetuate the use of a male perception
of infertility as controlling and place the female experience of infertil-
ity beyond the scope of relevant discussion.197
Juxtaposing the actual life experiences of a woman undergoing
fertility treatment and the experiences asserted under the gender-neu-
190. See Littleton, supra note 177, at 1279. Littleton argues that when we ignore a feature
that distinguishes women from men we do not only ignore that feature, we devalue it. See id.
191. This rationale is the result of applying Wendy Williams's equal treatment argument to
the condition of infertility. See generally Williams, supra note 65. But see generally Littleton,
supra note 177; Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955
(1984) (applying the equal treatment argument to sex discrimination in the constitutional
context).
192. The author recognizes that a difference exists between issues of sex and those of gender
and, therefore, one cannot use the two terms interchangeably.
193. See Littleton, supra note 177, at 1302 ("[E]quality, belonging to both law and to lan-
guage, provides its own case study of phallocentrism.").
194. See Minow, supra note 81, at 39.
195. See id. at 13 ("Legal treatment of difference tends to take for granted an assumed point
of comparison: women are compared to the unstated norm of men ... .
196. See id.
197. See Littleton, supra note 177, at 1306 ("[E]quality analysis defines as beyond its scope
precisely those issues that women find crucial to their concrete experience as women. Legal
analysis 'runs out' when it encounters 'real' difference, and only becomes available if and when
the difference is analogized to some experience that men can have too."). With infertility this
point is especially problematic because men too can be infertile.
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tral argument will also expose the gender-neutral fallacy.198 Once ex-
posed, a subsequent refusal to find that these women fall within the
scope of the PDA will potentially deny a woman undergoing this
treatment the opportunity of having a family while remaining em-
ployed, thereby frustrating the primary goal of the PDA. 199 Is the an-
swer then to substitute a woman's perspective for a man's? 200 This is
not the right answer for two reasons: First, this substitution raises the
traditional objection of special treatment because it would recognize a
woman's different perspective to provide extra protection; and second,
perhaps more important, to do so would perpetuate the use of the
unstated male norm allowing a woman's perspective to remain de-
fined as different.20 1 Instead, the answer lies in accepting the existence
of a woman's experience of infertility and giving that experience
value.202 This is what the PDA attempts to do.203 Now that the inher-
ent sex bias of labeling infertility as gender-neutral has been revealed
and the existence of a woman's perspective has been accepted, a tight
legal analysis 2°4 can begin to determine whether the scope of the PDA
includes women undergoing fertility treatment.
It is important to remember that accepting the life experience of
women undergoing fertility treatment is only the first step of an accu-
rate analysis.205 At this stage any attempt to advocate adopting such a
woman's perspective as more correct than a man's perspective would,
as stated, appear simply to exchange one partial perspective for an-
other.206 Instead the ultimate decision-whether it be the male expe-
rience, the female experience or some compilation of the two-must
198. See Wishik, supra note 183, at 72-74. Wishik writes that feminist jurisprudence requires
the use of this remedy when attempting to resolve problematic issues of perspective. See id.
Wishik argues that this juxtaposition reveals that when the law incorrectly labels something as
gender-neutral, the law devalues a woman's experience. See id.
199. See supra Part III.B.
200. See Minow, supra note 81, at 41. Minow notes that this may appear to be what the
Supreme Court did in California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (hold-
ing that a California statute that requires employers to provide a minimum level of pregnancy-
related benefits beyond those required by PDA does not discriminate against male employees).
Minow, however, argues that the problem of difference should be addressed through the use of
multiple perspectives. See Minow, supra note 81, at 14; see also Wishik, supra note 183, at 75-76.
201. See Minow, supra note 81, at 32.
202. See generally Littleton, supra note 177.
203. See supra Part II.B.
204. See Bartlett, supra note 177, at 843.
205. See id. at 846 ("Asking the woman question does not require decision in favor of a
woman. Rather, the method requires the decisionmaker to search for gender bias and to reach a
decision in the case that is defensible in light of that bias.").
206. See Minow, supra note 81, at 46 ("What interests us, given who we are and where we
stand, affects our ability to perceive.").
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be made in light of what Congress created the PDA to accomplish.20 7
Therefore, if in the end the women's perspective of infertility is se-
lected, it will be chosen because it is more complete than any other.
To begin interpreting whether women undergoing fertility treat-
ment are within the scope of the PDA, simply recognizing the exist-
ence of a woman's alternative perspective of infertility will be
meaningless unless those that consider the question also acknowledge
two additional points: First, that their view of this woman's experi-
ence, which may not be their own, is limited; and second, that this
limitation is more than a gap in knowledge, but rather an affirmative
duty to gather more information. 20 8 If this duty remains unheeded,
the result may still force women undergoing fertility treatment into a
category that does not fit: infertility as a gender-neutral condition
and, therefore, outside the scope of the PDA.20 9 Only integrating the
actual life experience of women undergoing fertility treatment into
legal analysis can achieve the general commitment to equal opportu-
nity that the PDA requires.
Integrating the experience of these women means that all aspects
of their life experience are relevant to the analysis.210 The life experi-
ence of women undergoing fertility treatment is that a condition that
interferes with conception thwarts these women's attempts to become
pregnant. This condition is identified only after their failure to be-
come pregnant. As a result, these women have chosen to receive ther-
apeutic treatment that, if successful, will result in pregnancy.
Therefore, a woman receiving fertility treatment has a potential for
pregnancy.
207. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 155 (1976) (Brennan J., dissenting)
("However one defines the risks ... the determinative question must be whether the social
policies and aims to be furthered by Title VII and filtered through the phrase 'to discrimi-
nate' ... fairly forbid [the alleged discriminatory practice in question].").
208. See Minow, supra 81, at 75 n.304 (citing BARBARA JOHNSON, A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE
16 (1987)). Minow writes:
If I perceive my ignorance as a gap in knowledge instead of an imperative that changes
the very nature of what I think I know, then I do not truly experience my ignorance.
The surprise of otherness is that moment when a new form or ignorance is suddenly
activated as an imperative.
Id.
209. See id. at 91.
210. See Bartlett, supra note 177, at 856-58; see also Minow, supra note 81, at 44 ("Instead of
considering the entire individual, we often select one characteristic as representative of the
whole."). The Krauel court rejected as irrelevant the fact that women undergo most of the treat-
ment even when their inability to conceive is due to a male factor. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist
Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 114 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd, 95 F.3d 674 (8t' Cir. 1996). The court
saw this fact simply as a burden that medicine has placed on women. See id. This fact, however,
is relevant, not because it stands for a woman's greater burden, but because it is part of a wo-
man's experience of infertility.
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Let us now move this discussion into the workplace. The discus-
sion now concerns a woman who wants to remain employed while un-
dergoing fertility treatment in an attempt to start or enlarge a family.
This is exactly what Congress created the PDA to protect. Therefore,
not only does denying women who are undergoing fertility treatment
protection from unfair employment practices defy common sense, but
a failure to do so would lead to a result that Congress intended the
PDA to prevent.
The above analysis, which considers the existence of alternate
perspectives and the recognition of life experiences to further the so-
cial policies and aims of the PDA, is also supported by the PDA's
legislative history. As stated, Congress enacted the PDA in response
to the Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert.211 Congress specifically
endorsed the view of the Gilbert dissenters. 212 When Justice Brennan
stated in his dissent that the majority's inability to define the exclusion
of pregnancy from a disability plan as sex discrimination "offends
common sense," 213 he further explained that the issue of whether the
defendant's disability plan discriminated against women by failing to
provide coverage for pregnancy appeared to turn on the "conceptual
framework chosen to identify the ... features of the [respondent's
disability] program. '"214 Justice Brennan did not recognize the fact
that how the issue was presented depended on the identity or perspec-
tive of the presenter to explain away one perspective of the issue while
embracing another.21 5 Instead, this recognition served as Justice
Brennan's basis to advocate for the examination of more relevant in-
formation, which included "due consideration to the uniqueness of
'disadvantaged' individuals" and a "realistic understanding of the con-
ditions found in today's labor environment," when conducting a tight
legal analysis. 216
211. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
212. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4750.
213. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.125, 149 (1976) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
214. Id. at 147 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Brennan recognized that from the petitioner's per-
spective, the program excluded risks that are specific to women from an otherwise comprehen-
sive plan, while the respondent framed the issue as a "gender-free assignment of risks." Id. As
stated, this issue of alternative perspectives also exists with the proponents and opponents to
finding a woman undergoing fertility treatment as within the scope of the PDA.
215. See id. at 147-48 (Brennan, J. dissenting); see also supra notes 205-207 and accompany-
ing text.
216. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159 (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)). The full refer-
ence to Lau reads: "[In Lau,] a unanimous Court recognized that discrimination is a social phe-
nomenon encased in a social context and therefore, unavoidably takes its meaning from the
desired end products of the relevant legislative enactment, end products that may demand due
consideration to the uniqueness of 'disadvantaged' individuals." Id.; see also supra note 204 and
accompanying text. The existence of an alternative perspective presents new facts, and "new
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Therefore, finding that women undergoing fertility treatment are
within the PDA's scope has support from the canons of statutory in-
terpretation, the PDA's legislative history, and also in common-sense,
which was Congress's true motivation for amending Title VII with the
PDA. Perhaps the only remaining barrier to the inclusion of these
women is simply the words that Congress chose to further its purpose.
In 1978, when Congress amended Title VII it probably seemed
rational, or even slightly advanced 217 to use the words "pregnancy,
childbirth and other related medical conditions" to reach discrimina-
tion on the basis of a woman's potential for pregnancy. In 1998, how-
ever, ARTs have created the potential for pregnancy where it never
existed before. 218 Due to the significant medical advances with ARTs,
the legal system is faced with many new questions that our laws at
times seem unable to address as written. 219 Therefore, a court may
attempt to analogize the issue presented to an existing body of law,2 20
create new law,221 or, as the court in Krauel did, hold that because the
legislative body did not contemplate the presented situation when it
drafted the legislation, the legislation should not cover the issue.222
With the advent of new ARTs and their increasing use, the potential
facts present opportunities for improved understandings and 'integrations."' Bartlett, supra
note 177, at 851.
217. Congressional attempts "to inject the abortion issue into every passing bill," including
the PDA, suggests that Congress still saw the scope of abortion rights as an unclear and emerg-
ing area of the law. 124 CONG. REc. 21,442 (1978). If five years after the Supreme Court recog-
nized a woman's right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Congress still
considered abortion-related matters only as emerging issues, then arguably the seed to include
ARTs within the PDA's scope had not yet even been planted in Congress because the first IVF
baby was not born until 1978, the year of the PDA's enactment.
218. For example, physicians have begun to extract immature sperm from the testes of men,
who due to blockages ejaculate no sperm at all, and through micro-manipulation use a single
sperm to fertilize an egg. See Sharon Begley, The Baby Myth, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 4, 1995, at 43.
This fertilization process is called intracytoplasmic sperm injection, or ICSI. See Dolores Kong,
Clinics Get Little Oversight; What Price Pregnancy?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 5, 1996, at Al.
219. Many legal questions exist regarding what type of laws apply to ARTs-related issues.
See ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 103-14.
220. See id. Who owns frozen embryos? Is this handled by property law or adoption law?
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that "preembryos are not, strictly
speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category .... "). What about
surrogacy issues? See In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), modified, 537
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (The "only concept of law that can presently attach to surrogacy parenting
arrangements are contract law and parenspatriae concepts for the benefit of the child."). Should
the laws for sperm donation apply to egg donation? See McDonald v. McDonald, 196 AD.2d 7,
12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that based on a couple's intention to have and raise offspring,
the recipient of egg donation is recognized as the natural mother and the donor relinquished all
potential parental rights).
221. Minnesota, Louisiana, and Illinois have amended their laws on homicide to include de-
stroying or discarding embryos. See Robertson, supra note 5, at 108.
222. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 112 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd,
95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
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for new lawsuits will also increase. Perhaps it is time for an amend-
ment that reflected the realities of 1978 to be amended to reflect the
realities of 1998.
CONCLUSION
Women undergoing fertility treatment to assist with conception
currently face two risks not associated with their treatment that em-
ployees with other conditions do not face: their employer's health
plans may deny coverage for these procedures, or their employers
may terminate them for "excessive absenteeism" while undergoing
their fertility treatment. The question of whether these women have a
cause of action under Title VII, as amended by the PDA, which de-
fines discrimination on the basis of a woman's potential for pregnancy
as discrimination on the basis of sex, now confronts the courts.
The fact that courts may reach different conclusions on this issue
suggests that two differing perspectives of infertility and its treatment
exist. A court that allows a woman undergoing fertility treatment to
state a claim recognizes that women and men do not have the same
experience of infertility and fertility treatment. For a woman, infertil-
ity and fertility treatment are inseparable. A woman seeks diagnosis
and treatment to learn why she cannot conceive and to assist with
conception. Therefore, one may view a woman undergoing fertility
treatment as having a potential for pregnancy. A court that dismisses
this woman's claim-by defining infertility as gender-neutral-does
not recognize this woman's experience of infertility. Instead the court
will advance what can be termed a male experience of infertility,
which does not include a potential for pregnancy. Moreover, a court
that dismisses such-a claim is frustrating Congress's intention to pro-
tect women from employment discrimination resulting from a wo-
man's potential for pregnancy. Congress amended Title VII to
prevent employers from affecting a woman's employment status based
solely on an outdated belief that she will resign after she becomes
pregnant.
Including a woman undergoing fertility treatment within the
scope of the PDA would further Congress's purpose by protecting
that woman's potential for pregnancy. After all, if the initial premise
is that an employer may discriminate against women on the belief that
they will become pregnant, it necessarily follows that when a woman
informs her employer that she is actively attempting to become preg-
nant she will face the same discrimination.
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